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STATE AGENCIES OF CONTROL AND
ENFORCEMENT OF AERONAUTICAL LAWS,*
REED

G.

LANDISt

Several years ago a group of us interested in aviation became
convinced that the day of the "gypsy flier" and his associate, the
"jenny" type of private owner, had passed. We appreciated fully
the fine part they had played in the hard hungry years after the war.
We knew the hardships and hazards they had suffered, driven by
their enthusiasm and confidence in aviation, into a so-called business
that could "not secure sufficient public support to pay for proper
equipment, airport, maintenance, et cetera. Feeling as we did about
those sterling pioneers, it was with great and genuine regret that we
concluded they must go from Illinois, and make way for aviation
as a business, with modern equipment and methods.
The situation was carefully studied. Reports of coroners' juries
were investigated. We were fortunate in having had experienced
airmen in contact with the coroners' inquests for some time. Laws
were looked up, meetings held, officials interviewed, and the Department of Commerce officials consulted-and it was found that we
could get little help from Washington.
Those Chicago air operations of a definite interstate character
were being pretty well operated and obeyed the regulations. They
did not have accidents, in the Chicago district at least. They were
not our problem. Several school, sightseeing, and charter activities
were simularly well financed and operated. They obeyed the law
too, and their freedom from accidents indicated that they were not
the source of our trouble.
The crashes, and headlines, resulted from the operations of
those formerly known as "gypsy"--justly called now the shorter and
more fitting name, "gyps." They carefully avoided interstate operations. They held themselves carefully clear of federal regulations,
sometimes on the advice of barracks lawyers-and on occasions with
the advice of real attorneys. Obviously, some other authority than
the federal had to be invoked.
*Portion of the paper upon this subject read at the Legislative Air
,Parley of Midwest States, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, February 24, 1930.
tChairman, Aeronautical Navigation Committee, State of Illinois; mem-

ber Board of Directors of the AIR

LAw INSTITUTE.
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at best is clumsy.46 No rules have been established to provide for
the filing of complaints by third parties.
Because of the short maximum license period there have been
virtually no revocation proceedings conducted by the Commission.
Disciplinary action has been taken almost exclusively by action on
applications for renewal of license. There have been several cases
in which the applicant has been placed on "probation" but in each
case he has sooner or later been restored into the good graces of
4

the Commission.

T

General Reallocations. From time to time it has been necessary
to make "reallocations" of broadcasting stations. It may be necessary to go through this process again in the future, and to go
through analogous processes in portions of the spectrum other than
the broadcast band. The most extensive allocation yet made was
that effective November 11, 1928, in which the assignments of 94%
of the stations were changed.
The procedure adopted by the Commission for such action has
been partly described in the discussion of the General Electric Company case in this article. It consisted in setting up a tentative reallocation of which all stations were notified, effective at a later date
(the expiration of the license period). Each station dissatisfied
with its assignment was given opportunity for hearing if it filed application for modification of its assignment specifying the frequency,
power and hours of operation which it desired. Other stations
which, under the tentative reallocation, would be adversely affected
were then notified and given an opportunity to oppose the application.

48

If the General Electric Company case were the only case on the
subject, it would have to be conceded that it is doubtful whether
this procedure met, the requirements of the Act. Since the court's
decision in that case, however, it has several times, both expressly
and by necessary implication, upheld the procedure. 49 All the es46. See 1929 Report of Standing Committee on Radio Law, p. 74.
47. One station WNBA of Forest Park, Ill., was suspended for 30 days
for frequency deviation in April, 1928. There have been several instances
where a station has been put. upon "probation," which consisted of the issuance of 30-day licenses instead of the usual 3 months license. In several cases
this was due to the broadcasting of private disputes by warring stations (2nd
Ann. Rep., pp. 159-161) and in another case, to the alleged use of obscenity
(U. S. Daily, Jan. 7, 10, 11, 18, 25, 1930). In the first, cases, the action
followed hearings upon applications for renewal; in the latter there was no
hearing at all. In each case the station was later restored to good standing.
48. The procedure is set forth in a statement adopted and published by
the Commission, 2nd Ann. Rep., 51-52.
49. City of New York v. Commission, 36 F. (2d) 115 (certiorari now
pending in U. S. Sup. Ct.); Great Lakes Broadcasting Co. v. Commission
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sential requirements of due process of law would seem to have been
met. The hearings should be regarded as really having been held
on the applications of the stations affected for renewal of license.
Issuance of Permits and Licenses.

Construction permits, li-

censes and other formal authorizations are signed by the Chairman
of the Commission (a burdensome duty which might well be delegated to the Secretary), under the seal of the Commission. They
are thereupon usually delivered to the Radio Division of the Department of Commerce which, in turn, delivers them to the grantees
and licensees, through the radio supervisor in the several districts.
Two interesting situations have already arisen involving the
question as to when the right to the document vests in the grantee
or licensee and as to when the grantee or licensee is justified in
considering that he has the authority to construct or to operate. In
one case, now involved in a pending appeal,5 0 the Commission's
minutes showed a granting of certain applications for construction
permits to several different grantees. A dispute thereafter arose
between the grantees with the result that the construction permits
were never executed or, if executed, were never delivered. The
case involves other issues (e. g., as to whether the Commission's
action was upon certain conditions which the grantees failed to fulfill) which need not be discussed here. In another case, the Commission, by action recorded in its minutes, granted certain licenses
and construction permits; both the licenses and permits were duly
executed and it remained only to forward them through the Department of Commerce. Before they were forwarded, however,
the Commission was served with a stay order from the Court of
Appeals. 5
Miscellaneous. Under Section 10 the Commission has power,
which it frequently exercises, to require licensees to furnish it with
information under oath. This is usually done by sending out questionnaires.
Under Section 11, in the event that for any reason the Commission cannot act because of absence of the Commissioners, etc.,
the Secretary of Commerce is given temporary licensing authority.
There has, as yet, been no occasion for recourse to this provision. 2
(not yet reported), U. S. Daily, Jan. 7, 13, 1930. See also Tagg etc. v.
United States, 74 L. Ed..., Adv. Ops., 1929, pp. 287-293.
50. Universal Service Wireless, Inc., No. 5005.
51. In Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Commission, No. 4991. See
U. S. Daily, Feb. 27, 1930.
52. During the interim between March 16, 1928, and March 28, 1928
(the date on which the Act containing the Davis Amendment became law),
the Secretary of Commerce was temporarily the licensing authority under
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period of time, an application which is substantially the same as
one which has been heard and acted upon. No definite time limit
has yet been set but manifestly the matter should be covered at an
early date by formal regulations.
The Commission also, as a rule, will not consider more than
one application from a particular applicant at a time; for example,
an applicant is ordinarily not permitted to apply for the use of
several different frequencies in the alternative. These are cases:
however, where this is unavoidable.
Scope of Decision on a Particular Application. Several unanswered questions arise under this heading. If a station, by application for modification, asks for a better frequency, may the Commission, as a result of a hearing give it a frequency other than that
applied for, or one which is inferior to that which it already has?
May it otherwise restrict the station's present privileges, such as by
reducing its hours of operation or its power? It will avoid an unnecessary duplication of hearings if the Commission is recognized
to have such power; on the other hand, injustice may easily result
to the applicant who ordinarily does and cannot present his case
with such an eventuality in view. It would seem that, before making,
such a decision, the Commission should give the applicant a further
opportunity to be heard.
Suppose Station A and Station B are dividing time on the
same frequency, and Station A applies for full time on the frequency. If the Commission, after hearing both Stations A and B,
grants the application, may it forthwith assign Station B to another
frequency where it will cause interference to stations which did not
participate in the hearing? Natural justice requires that such other
stations also have an opportunity to be heard; but the Commission
has frequently failed to give the opportunity to such stations.
Informal Applications and Hearings. Under one of the early
general orders of the Commission provision was made for hearings
on complaints of interference.4"
Practically no one has availed
himself formally of this provision. Unfortunately such a hearing
has no legal status and is not the basis for an appeal.
The law is defective in not providing some method by which,
upon proper application to that end, the license of another may be
modified. Such an application might be used to raise directly the
issue of undue interference caused by a station with too much power
on the same frequency, etc. In view of the liberal attitude of the
45a. G. 0. 15, June 7, 1927, 1st Ann. Rep., p. 16. This order was based
on what the writer believes to be an erroneous construction of Sec. 4 (f).
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Court of Appeals in construing Section 16, it may be that such an
application would be recognized as an application for modification
under the Act as it now stands.
Similarly there should be some concrete method, under suitable restrictions, of forcing the Commission, on the application of
persons with a legitimate interest, to set applications for renewal
for hearing. There are at present no rules providing for such applications, although persons are permitted to file complaints and
affidavits which are sometimes taken into consideration by the Commission in determining whether it will designate an application for
45
renewal for hearing. b
Many informal hearings are held by the Commission, sometimes
in support of pending applications and sometimes with reference to
other matters. Pending applications are also urged upon individual
Commissioners by personal conferences in their offices. The worst
offenders, outside of the applicants themselves, are Senators and
Congressmen. Such methods of supporting applications are necessarily ex parte and have led to a great deal of injustice. On
the other hand, there are occasions when it seems proper for Members of Congress or other public officials to appear openly before
the Commission, to urge, for example, that their state has not received its due share of broadcasting facilities. Someone has to
speak in behalf of the state's rights (which, fortunately or unfortunately, are recognized by the Davis Amendment) and, so long as
such delegations avoid emphasizing the claims of a particular station
at the expense of other stations not present, there is no very substantial ground for criticism. It is simply unforunate that state
boundaries should have anything to do with radio regulation. The
ideal object is good radio service for the entire United States.
Revocation of License. The grounds for revocation of license,
and the procedure which must be followed, are covered by Section
14. No provision is made for revocation of construction permits, or
for suspension or other discipline less than complete revocation.
The writer believes, however, that the word "license" is to be construed to cover construction permits, and that the power of suspension is to be inferred from the power to revoke. Whether the
C6mmission has power to discipline by modifying the license so
as to cover less favorable privileges is uncertain. The procedure
45b. See Opinion of General Counsel, No. 32, on Petition of Adrian M.
Kelly concerning advertisements of Lucky Strike cigarettes, U. S. Daily,
April 23, 1929; see also petition of Radio Protective Association that Commission refuse licenses to R. C. A. Communications, Inc., because of operation of Section 13. U. S. Daily, Dec. 2, 1929.
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also several of the essential features of the eventual license, such
as frequency, power, hours of operation, etc. This seems thoroughly
logical.
No peculiar problem (other than those already discussed) is
involved in determining whether Commission action in a particular
case is to be considered as a granting or a denial of an application
for modification. Nor is there any such problem with reference
to applications for the Commission's consent or approval to the assignment of a permit or license. The issues on such applications
are necessarily very much the same as are raised by new applicants
as to their fitness and qualifications to operate a station.
Who Are Interested Parties? Whatever be the character of the
application, the principles determining who should be notified and
given an opportunity to be heard are substantially the same. Engineering facts and principles prescribe, with reasonable definiteness,
what licensees of existing stations, what grantees of permits to construct new stations, and what applicants requesting authority to
establish new stations, will be adversely affected by granting the application. When the application seeks to construct a station to
operate on a specified frequency, or to modify a license so as to authorize the use of a specified frequency, all stations using that frequency (with perhaps certain geographical limitations in the case of
regional or local channels), or closely adjacent frequencies in the
same region, should be, and usually are, notified. Similarly stations that would be affected by a requested increase of power or of
hours of operation should be notified.
There has been complaint in some quarters against the Commission's requirement that an application specify the frequency desired, on the ground that this throws the applicant into a controversy
with persons with whom he has no quarrel. In the writer's opinion this complaint is not sound. Since the broadcast band, for example, is already overcrowded, it is not unfair to require the applicant to select the assignment which he regards as best suited for
his station, either from the point of view of interference or from
the point of view of the qualifications (or lack thereof) of licensees
now using the frequency. In other words, the Commission simply
requires the applicant to select what he regards as the weakest and
most vulnerable spot in the spectrum for his assault, and declines
to take that burden upon itself. The only alternative would be for
the Commission to notify and pass on the merits of all stations of a
given class before acting upon any application proposing a new
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station of that class, as well as perhaps many other stations who
would be interfered with if any of a number of channels were
finally assigned to the applicant.
Where there are several applications involving the same frequency, the Commission endeavors to set the same hearing date for
all of them.
There is an increasing tendency to recognize interests of an
economic character. For example, in a town which is able to support only two stations with advertising or sponsored programs, each
of the two existing stations is considered to have a4 legitimate interest in opposing the establishment of a new station 1b
A most difficult situation arises out of defects in Section 16,
which accords the right of appeal to defeated applicants but does not
recognize any right of appeal in interested respondents who may be
adversely affected by the granting of applications. The situation
is being partly met by regarding a hearing as being also a hearing
upon a respondent's application for renewal if he has one pending.
This device will obviously fail to reach many cases and will not be
helpful when the three-year license period is restored.
The defects of Sections 11 and 16 as to the rights of respondents
are among the most serious in the Act and call urgently for amendment by Congress."
The Act gives no status to States or other political subdivisions, 4 5 or to Governmental Departments, or to the representatives
of foreign nations or stations, with respect to applications and hearings before the Commission, although all of them will from time to
time be vitally interested. The Commission has, however, pursued
a very liberal policy in this regard and permits intervention in its
hearings of virtually anyone having a legitimate interest (and, occasionally, of persons who have not).
Repetition or Multiplicity of Applications. The Commission is

observing an unwritten rule against considering within a reasonable
43b. This was the principal basis for the opposition to the establishment of a new station by the Richmond Development Corporation at Roanoke,
Virginia, which resulted in a refusal by a divided Commission to grant a
third extension of date of completion under a construction permit. This
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Richmond Development
Corporation v. Commission (not yet reported), U. S. Daily, Nov. 7, 1929.
It is interesting to contrast tjhe position taken by the Commission in this case
with the position taken in a case involving Buffalo stations, in which an
application to establish a new station in Buffalo was allowed largely because
all the existing stations in that city were controlled by one concern. U. S.
Daily, Nov. 1,'
2, 4, Dec. 23, 30, 1929.
44. See 1929 Report of Standing Committee on Radio Law, pp. 461-469.
45. States and political subdivisions were recognized in those portions
of Sec. 5 of the Act which have never gone into effect.
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renewal of license in reducing the station's power from 500 watts
to 100 watts was to be considered a denial of the application. In
three cases appealed in November, 1929,40 the Commission had,
without hearing and in acting upon applications for renewal, granted
renewal licenses differing substantially in desirability of channel
(from 1310 kc. to 1500 kc.) and slightly in hours of operation;
these appeals were later voluntarily dismissed, however, because of
later Commission action restoring the stations to a more desirable
channel and increasing their hours of operation. In Westinghouse
Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Commission,4 now pending before the Court
of Appeals, complaint is made of Commission action on an application for renewal of license, consisting of the insertion of a condition
in the renewal license not contained in the previous license; the condition was to the effect that if a proper applicant applied for the
channel for use in the Second Zone, appellant's license would not be
again renewed.

In The Journal Company v. Commission,4

now

pending before the Court of Appeals, complaint is made of Commission action in reducing (without hearing) the service area of a
broadcasting station at the end of a license period by assigning new
stations to the channel and 6y increasing the power of a station
already assigned to the channel, with the result that the renewal
license actually permitted appellant's station to serve only a much
smaller area than the previous license.
The only possible qualification which suggests itself to the rule
laid down in the General Electric Company case is where the change
is not substantial. For example, a renewal license may give a station exactly the same grade and character of channel which it had
before, or even a better one. with no change in its power, hours of
operation or other privileges. Even in such a case, however, the
safe course would seem to be to regard an opportunity for hearing as necessary so as to avoid any abuses. One channel may appear equivalent to another to the Commission and yet in practice
may prove to be inferior for the purposes of the station. It is
obvious that, as a practical matter, where the new channel is equivalent or superior in character, the station will neither avail itself of
the opportunity for hearing nor appeal.
When must Applications for License be Designated for Hearing. As has already been pointed out, applications for license fall
40. Triangle Broadcasters (WHFC) v. Commission, Victor C. Carlson
(WEHS) v. Commission, Fred C. Schoenwolf (WKBI) v. Commission, U. S.
Daily, Nov. 12, 1929, Dec. 2, 1929.
41. U. S. Daily, Nov. 20, 1929.
42. U. S. Daily, Nov. 12, 1929.
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under two general categories. When the application for license is
with respect to a station for which a construction permit is not a
prerequisite, the principles should be exactly the same as those governing applications for renewal of license. The same features are
to be regarded as essential.
Where, however, the application for license follows a construction permit, the situation is materially different. Upon what the
writer believes to be the correct construction of Section 21, the Commission is legally obligated to grant the license upon the terms and
conditions, and with the privileges, specified in the construction permit unless the grantee of the permit has in some respect failed to
meet "all the terms, conditions, and obligations set forth in the application and permit" and unless some "cause or circumstance arising
or first coming to the knowledge of the licensing authority since
the granting of the permit would, in the judgment of the licensing authority, make the operation of such station against public
interest." The section also requires that "said license shall conform
generally to the terms of said permit," which would seem to contemplate that the permit -should cover frequency, power, hours- of
operation and other features of the eventual license to be issued
when the station is completed. There is, therefore, no occasion for
designating the application for license for hearing or for doing other
than granting it, except for a violation of the terms of the permit or
for some new cause or circumstance; in case of either exception,
there must be a hearing before the application for license may be
denied or granted on terms other than those covered by the permit.
In such a hearing, the burden should be upon the Commission.
If, however, the application for license asks for terms differing from those specified in, or covered by, the permit, the application should pro tanto be treated exactly the same as an application
for modification of license.
When must Applications for Construction Permit be Designated
for Hearing. Curiously, Section 11 does not mention construction
permits and consequently there is no specific requirement in the
Act that a hearing be held before an application for construction
permit be denied. This is clearly the result of oversight. Since,
however, under Section 21 the Commission is guided by the same
standard as that in which it is guided in acting on other kinds of
applications, namely, that of public interest, convenience or necessity,
and since Section 16 covering appeals manifestly contemplates that
there shall have been a hearing prior to a decision denying an ap-
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plication for a construction permit, it may be taken for granted
that Congress intended that applicants for construction permits
should be-accorded the same opportunity for hearing as' other applicants. The Commission is following this construction of the Act.
In the opinion of the writer an application for construction
permit is to be viewed as a preliminary application for license and,
so far as other interested parties may be concerned, all issues as to
whether a license should ultimately be granted to the applicant should
be determined at the time the application for construction permit is
acted upon. Not only should the Commission decide the bare issue
as to whether or not it will permit an apparatus of a certain type to
be constructed and the date by which it must be constructed; it
should also decide all the other essential features of the eventual
license, such as frequency, power, hours of operation, etc. Justice
requires this with respect to the applicant so that he may know what
privileges he is to enjoy before making the investment; it also requires it with respect to other interested parties so that they may
have a chance to be heard on their objections before the applicant
has made the investment and acquired a certain legal status. If this
be the correct construction of the Act, then virtually all the essential
features of an application for license as above set forth are also
essential features of an application for construction permit and the
situation is substantially the same as to when a hearing must be
accorded, as is the case on applications for renewal of license. This
view is supported by the fact that Section 21 in setting forth what
should be contained in an application for construction permit follows
almost verbatim the language of Section 10, which sets forth what
must be contained in an application for license.
The Commission has adopted rather inconsistent positions on
the construction of Section 21. . In actual practice, on an application
for construction permit which is set for hearing, it views the application as being for a license and notifies all parties who would
be adversely affected by granting the license, specifying the frequency, power, hours of operation, etc., specified in the application
for construction permit. On the other hand, it has in many instances
taken the position that upon completion of the station it is not
obligated to issue to the grantee of a construction permit a license
specifying the frequency, power, or hours of operation specified
in the permit. It has taken this position in a statement recently
filed with the Court of Appeals on an appeal from one of its decisions. 3 The form of permit actually used by the Commission
43. WMAK Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Commission, U. S. Daily,
Dec. 23, 1929, Dec. 30, 1929, Jan. 10, 1930.
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purports to relieve the Commission from issuing a license conforming to the terms of the permit and specifies these terms only in tentative fashion. The writer is inclined to believe that the Commission
will not be upheld in this position.
An unusual type of hearing was held by the Commission in
November, 1929, when the state of New Jersey, through its attorney general, appeared to oppose the construction of a 50 KW
station (WABC) in northern New Jersey, the studio of the station
being in New York City. The Commission had already granted the
construction permit, so that the proceeding was an anomalous one.
The claim made was that the establishment of the station would
blanket local listeners so that they would not be able to receive
New Jersey stations within a certain frequency range. The station
owners finally surrendered the permit and sought to substitute a
location on Long Island. This location was opposed by civic and
radio trade groups in the neighborhood. These incidents serve to
illustrate some of the interests which may be affected by the construction of a new station and illustrate the necessity of publication
by the Commission of all such applications a reasonable time prior
43
to action upon them. a

When must Applications for Modification of License be Designated for Hearing. Whatever may have been the original intention
of Congress, applications for modification of license are recognized
by the Commission as the proper manner in which to seek a change
in frequency, power, hours of operation or other essential feature
of a license. When, however, the modification of license requested
involves a substantial alteration or rebuilding of apparatus, or a
change in the location of the transmitter, an application for construction permit must be filed-an unnecessarily cumbersome process.
Thus an increase of power may involve two applications. When an
application for modification is granted, the Commission does not
usually put it into effect until the beginning of the next license
period, and the modification is covered by the renewal license. This,
of course, is all right as long as the present maximum license period
for broadcasting stations is three months, but difficulties will arise
when a return is had to the three-year period originally provided
by the Act.
The Commission has also devised a form of application known
as an application for modification of construction permit which
covers not only requests for extension of time for completion but
43a.

See U. S. Daily, Oct. 22, Nov. 21, 26, 27, 30, Dec. 3, 20, 1929;

Jan. 2, 1930.
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by the United States in building aeroplanes and training flyers during
the war. Patent difficulties were largely overcome by cross license
agreements.1 When the war ended a large part of the accumulated
aeronautical material was placed on the market but was very largely
acquired by gypsy flyers to thrill crowds and satisfy the curious by
a circular flight at five or ten dollars per person. Happily all these
old "jennies" are now practically junk. Since the government did
not subsidize the industry the United States for some years lagged
behind the development in Europe. The country of Langley and the
Wrights was for some years trailing Europe in its support of this
new means of locomotion.
However this apathy was not to extend far beyond the deflation
period. The inventors, though the war support had ceased, were
not to be denied. Capitalists were beginning to see the importance
of the new developement. The factories which had turned out
aeroplanes during the war were still in existence and could readily
be devoted to the same purpose. Reports which tourists brought
back from Europe as to the wonderful air transportation in existence
there could not but exercise a certain influence. The technical
development of the aeroplane therefore continued until the Spirit
of St. Louis in charge of a single pilot crossed the Atlantic and
reached its destination with fuel to spare. Other less successful
flights across the same moat of water undertaken by companies of
two or three followed. If the Atlantic could be spanned by a single
hop no reason existed why communication between New York and
San Francisco or St. Paul and New Orleans should not be similarly
established. Air lines therefore today exist between San Francisco
and Los Angeles, between Chicago and St. Paul and between numerous other more or less connected points. No such extensive
network as exists in Europe exists here it is true. That is for the
future and probably for the very near future.
However the foundations for a network exist. There is probably no city of importance which does not today have one or more
privately or publicly owned air ports. Some of these were aviation
training grounds during the war. Others have been donated to the
cities by private individuals or have been acquired by purchase or
through condemnation. Vast sums of money have already been
expended on this new development. Vaster sums will presently be
expended. Chief Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of Ap1. The United States Attorney General in 1917 held that such an agreement is not in contravention of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 31 Opinions of
Attorney General 166.
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peals therefore say: "Aviation is today an established method of
transportation. The future, even the near future, will make it still
more general. The city that is without the foresight to build the
ports for the new traffic may soon be left behind in the race of competition. Chalcedon was called the city of the blind, because its
founders rejected the nobler site of Byzantium lying at their feet.
The need for vision of the future in the governance of cities has
not lessened with the years. The dweller within the gates, even more
than the stranger from afar, will pay the price of blindness." 2 Both
courts and legislatures have been quite active in the matter. Practically all the state legislatures have passed enabling acts. The
index of the 1929 Aviation Reports devotes ten full pages to an
analysis of the airport legislation enacted in 1929. Some ten cases
have already reached appellate courts. Without a single exception
the power of the various cities to acquire and maintain airports has
3
been sustained by these decisions.
The airmail service maintained by the United States government
has been an important factor in this development. It has resulted
not only in the development of a limited number of airports but in
the development of airways as well. These airways correspond to
ocean lanes just as air ports correspond to seaports. They are
naturally useful not only to the postal planes but to others as well.
They connect the most important cities and minimize some of the
inherent dangers of flight.
Nor are our large transcontinental railroads unaware of the
competition which the new development offers to them. Instead of
opposing what cannot be opposed they are accommodating themselves to the new situation. A trip from .New York to San Francisco
in forty eight hours without hardship and on a regularly established
basis is today possible, and consists partly of travel by railroad,
partly by plane. The legislatures of at least five states have in 1929
4
authorized the railways to engage in aviation.
The regulation which this new common carrier service is to be
subject to naturally presents some old difficulties and a number of
2. Hesse v. Rath 249 N. Y. 436, 164 N. E. 342 affirming 224 App. Div.

344, 230 N. Y. S. 676.

3. City of Wichita v. Clapp 125 Kan. 100, 263 P. 12; State v. Johnson
220 N. W. 273 (Neb.); Dysart v. City of St. Louis 11 S. W. (2d) 1045 (Mo.) ;
McClintock v. City of Rosebtrg 127 Or. 698, 273 P. 331; Douty v. Baltimore
155 Md. 125, 141 A. 499; Ennis v. Kansas City 11 S. W. (2d) 1054 (Mo.);
State ex rel. Hile v. Cleveland 26 Ohio App. 265, 160 N. E. 241. State ex rel.
Chandler v. Jackson 121 Ohio St. 186, 167 N. E. 396; In re Airport or Landing Field of City of Utica in Town of Marcy 134 Misc. Rep. 60, 234 N. Y. 668.
4. Illinois p. 590 sec. 1; Iowa Ch. 133; Michigan No. 193 sec. 1; Mis-

souri p. 345 sec. 2; Wisconsin Ch. 201 sec. 1.
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new difficulties as well. If the service is maintained between cities
of different states the first question naturally is whether the United
States or the individual states shall do the regulating. That such
a service is interstate commerce would not seem to be subject to
doubt. In 1928 the Colorado Public Utilities commission had before
it the application of a Delaware corporation for a certificate of
public convenience and necessity authorizing the applicant to operate
lines of aeroplanes for the carrying of passengers and express for
hire between Denver, Colorado and Kansas City, Missouri. No competing line existed. The applirant proposed to purchase four Fokker
Super-Universal monoplanes each carrying six passengers and one
pilot. The commission adopted as its standard of equipment and
qualification of pilots the standard prescribed by the Federal Government and the Colorado Commission of Aeronautics, required the
applicant to file proof that it had or would comply therewith, stated
that this being an interstate operation only the question of public
convenience and necessity did not arise and found that the Constitution of the United States and the laws of the state of Colorado
required that a certificate of public convenience and necessity be
issued to the applicant as prayed for.5
The regulation of intrastate as distinguished from interstate flying has been a burning question before the legislatures of the various
states in 1929. According to the report of the standing committee
on aeronautical law of the American Bar Association made to the
1929 meeting of that body, 19 states now require a federal license
for all aircraft and airmen; seven other states require such a license
for aircraft and airmen engaged in commercial flying; seven others
require either a state or federal license, while six require a state
license and the remaining nine have no regulation at all. 6 Such
provisions of course will affect airplanes engaged in common carrier
business inside of a state. The question still remains whether such
business shall be allowed to develop under competitive conditions
or whether it is better to eliminate competition. The Nevada Public
Service Commission in 1928 had before it three applications for
certificates of convenience and necessity for conducting aircraft
carrier service between points in that sparsely settled state. While
the plans of the applicants somewhat overlapped, they were able at
the hearing to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement by which separate "home ports" were assigned to the applicants and each was
given a preference of two hours at such home port over any oper5. Re U. S. Airways Inc. P. U. R. 1928E, 518.
6. Pages 116 and 117 of such report.
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ator away from his home port. This meant that none of the applicants were at liberty to proceed with passengers from the home port
of any of the other applicants until after a period of two hours had
elapsed from the time the request for transportation was received
unless the home port applicant had waived the rule. The commission
put the stamp of its approval on this arrangement. 7
The question whether the operation of air line intrastate common carriers shall be on a competitive basis has been directly presented to the Pennsylvania public service commission. In 1927 that
commission approved the application of the Gettysburg Flying Service, Inc., for a certificate of convenience and necessity the company
having provided itself with suitable landing fields and planes. Its
purpose was to establish a taxi service from Gettysburg to points
and places in Pennsylvania and to conduct sightseeing trips over
the Gettysburg battlefield. 8 A year later the "Battlefield Airways,
Inc." made a similar request. The commission in denying the application said:
"The question presented for determination is, Shall the non-competitive principle control under the facts in this case?
"We are convinced from consideration of all of the facts and arguments that the applicant has failed to meet the legislative requirement
to establish that the proposed service is necessary or proper for the
service, accommodation, convenience, and safety of the public and so
find and determine.
"The Commission recognizes that the policy of the nation and state
is to foster and encourage aviation. The facts in this case, however,
are in the opinion of the Commission convincing that in a community
such as Gettysburg the creation of unnecessary and destructive competition could not and would not be a contributing factor in the development of commercial flying service in Pennsylvania, but would be a
decided hindrance to its development. Common carrier transportation
by aircraft must be developed for some time at least by and through
private enterprise which should not be required to struggle for an existence in the competitive field under conditions as existing in this
case."9
On the other hand the opposite conclusion seems to have been
arrived at in California where the commission is operating under a
constitutional provision which is very similar to that of Pennsylvania.
Says W. Jefferson Davis, himself a resident of California:
7. Re Francis A. Riordan. Re Hucking Aircraft Corporation. Re
Nevada Airways Inc. P. U. R. 1928D 854.
8. Re Gettysburg Flying Service Inc. P. U. R. 1928B, 287.
9. Re Battlefields Airways Inc. P. U. R. 1929A, 476; 17 Pennsylvania
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"The suggestion has been frequently made that aircraft carriers be
required to apply to the Railroad Commission of California for certificates of public convenience and necessity authorizing them to engage
in public service. The Common Carrier Sub-Committee of the California Aircraft Conference Committee reported unanimously against
requiring certificates of public convenience and necessity and this report was later adopted by the General Aircraft Conference Committee
of the Railroad Commission and concurred in by the Statewide Aviation
Committee of the California Development Association. As a result of
these recommendations the Legislature in 1929 took no action in regard
to certificates of public convenience and necessity.
"It was generally felt that there was no justification in the position
taken by those who favor certificates of public convenience and necessity as a prerequisite to operating air lines within the state.
"Any such regulatory legislation is moreover very premature. There
are only a few regularly established passenger air services in operation
in California at this time. Air transport companies should be permitted
to charge what the traffic will bear, and there should be no restrictions
for many years to come. There may be some destructive competition
and duplication of the services such as already exists between Los
Angeles and San Francisco, and Chicago and St. Paul, and on the
Chicago-St. Paul Minneapolis route. It is entirely too early in the
development of air transport to create monopolies in favor of the line
which happens to commence operations first, and thus preclude companies which might provide the public with better service."' 1
Thus there is another conflict of opinion which will probably be
extended to other states as the question becomes a burning one. Of
course the situation as between two such large cities as San Francisco
and Los Angeles on the one hand and a taxi service out of the small
city of Gettysburg on the other is quite dissimilar and this fact may
be used to reconcile the two situations. It would seem, however, that
the real difficulty is a radical difference between radically different
theories whose existence is undeniable in our thought on the entire
matter of regulation of all utilities. Only the future can tell which
of the two will prevail in the struggle for existence which is sure
to come.
The only occasion which has been afforded to American courts
to discuss the question of common carriers has arisen out of a ten
minutes circular pleasure trip undertaken by a former lieutenant of
the naval service in a hydroplane in the course of which the plane
fell and two passengers were killed. Both held insurance policies
(either life or accident) which provided for certain increases if the
accident occurred while riding as a passenger in a "public conveyance
provided by a common carrier for passenger service." The pilot
10. State Regulation of Aircraft Common Carriers, 1 Air Law Review 55.
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would not go up with less than three passengers, carried only white
people, operated only on such days, at such hours and under such
conditions as pleased him, did not pretend to maintain regular schedules and did not advertise his business except so far as the mere
presence of the plane was an advertisement. Both the Circuit Court
of Appeals of the United States for the Fifth Circuit and the Alabama Supreme Court were presented with the question. Both held
that the hydroplane was not a common carrier, at least not on this
particular occasion within the meaning of the policy."'
It is obvious that most if not all the facts which militated in
these two cases against the contention that this particular hydroplane
was a public conveyance provided by a common carrier for passenger
service are absent in the air service which now exists between a
great many cities of this country. We can readily agree with the
conclusions arrived at in these insurance cases and in the same
breath hold that a service through the air which runs on schedule,
for which tickets can be bought by a proper person who has the price
and the inclination and which gets the occupants from one place to
another is as much to be classed as a common carrier as is the passenger service maintained by railroads, street cars, boats and motorbusses.
The Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc., requires the signature
of all of its passengers to a provision that "as a part of the consideration for the issuance of this ticket and of the acceptance of me
for transportation I hereby agree to the rules and conditions printed
on the reverse side of this ticket all of which are understood by me,
and are made a part of the contract for transportation evidenced by
this ticket." Among seven "conditions of passage" is the following:
"The user of this ticket agrees that the Company, in the performance
of the transportation covered by this ticket, is not a common carrier
for hire and/or liable as such, but is a private carrier; and that the
Company shall not be liable for injury or death to the person or
loss or damage to the property of the said user caused in any manner
whatsoever, whether attributable to negligence or not, occurring during and/or arising out of the performance, or failure of performance,
of the transportation for which this ticket is issued."' 12 This provision is not as new as might seem to. be the case. The extensive
and intensive development in Europe of passenger transportation
11. North American Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pitts 213 Ala. 102, 104 So. 21,
40 A. L. R. 1171; Brown v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California 8 F. (2d)
996.
12. For a copy of the entire contract see 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW.
36 and 37.
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through the air at a time now some years past when the dangers
inherently connected with such travel were considered to be greater
than they are considered today, naturally brought about the insertion into the contracts of transportation of exemption clauses which
are essentially identical with that just quoted. In view of this fact
the construction which these exemption clauses have received in
Europe by the courts is of the utmost interest on this side of the
Atlantic.
The first case t6 arise under such a provision involved a circular
flight at a popular bath and was therefore not as strong in its facts
as might be desired. The Amtsgericht (trial court) at Emden,
Germany, however, did not lay any stress on this fact but decided
in a well reasoned opinion that such a clause is void as being against
public policy.'" The Kreisgericht (circuit court) at Aurich reversed
this decision on the ground that such a clause is not against public
policy at least not until aviation has more fully developed. 14 In
reaching this decision the &urt did not mention the fact that the
flight was a circular one and for this reason might very well be held
not to be transportation at all. The decision of the Kreisgericht was
followed by other lower courts so that a square conflict of judicial
views came into being.
The Reichsgericht in two decisions has avoided the difficulty
with which these courts struggles by confining itself to a strict
construction of the exemption provision and by holding that such
a provision will not be construed to exempt the air line company
from liability caused by its own fault. 15
Finally the Zivillandesgericht in Prague has held that such an
exemption to be valid must be the deliberate and definite declaration
of the parties and that a one sided assertion through the handing
over of the ticket to the passenger without expressly calling his attention to the exemption clause which was printed in a language
which the passenger did not know is not sufficient. 16
It may be of interest to note that the American Air Transport
Association in a draft of a Uniform Passenger Contract which it
offers to the air passenger lines of the United States for adoption,
inserts among others the following clause: "If I am accepted as a
passenger, I voluntarily assume the ordinary risks of air transportation and stipulate that the company or companies represented herein
13.
14.
15.
16.
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shall not be responsible save for its or their own neglect of duty."
In commenting on this provision it is said: "Your committee deems
this clause the most important of the whole contract. If, while the
industry is young and the courts and the public are taking kindly
to the aviation industry, this clause can be adjudicated and upheld in
the appellate tribunals, needless to say, the advantages that will
accrue to the carriers are obvious. If it is not upheld, your committee believes that the only alternative will be statutory legislation
in the various states which will meet the situation."
A great deal of good would be accomplished if the air line companies were to adopt these sane and sensible suggestions. By being
reasonable in their demands they so arrange their affairs that they
may possibly obtain what they are asking for. However, a uniform
adoption of such a provision is perhaps out of the question at least
for the present. Certain air transportation companies though they
may be fully aware that a provision by which liability for their own
fault is sought to be avoided is not legally binding will nevertheless
insist on inserting it in their contracts with a view to obtaining
thereby a leverage with which to obtain better settlements with passengers injured than would otherwise be possible. It may therefore
be expected that courts will soon be confronted with a construction
of such a stringent exemption clause. The European cases hereinbefore referred to may, when this time comes, be of considerable
interest to all concerned.

